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RACIAL EQUALITY IN JOBS AND UNIONS,
COLLECTIVE BARGAINlNG, AND THE
BURGER COURTt
William B. Gould*
Makin' a road
For the rich old white men
To sweep over in their big cars
And leave me standin' here.
Langston Hughes1

I. INTRODUCTION
the foreseeable future, the Supreme Court of the United States
will be called upon to resolve many disputes resulting from the
existence of racial inequality in the collective bargaining process
and from the lack of full integration in union leadership. Those
disputes will arise primarily because black wor-kers are now challenging employers' and unions' practices which have hitherto been
thought to be protected under the rubric of free collective bargaining.
No one can deny that there is a new-found willingness among
black workers to challenge previously accepted practices. Yet some
courts seem unaware of that developing militancy. The recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
United Packinghouse, Food and Allied Workers v. NLRB,2 provides
an example. In that case, the court, speaking through Judge Skelly
Wright, held that an employer's "invidious discrimination on account of race or national origin,"3 was impermissible under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Judge Wright observed that
such discrimination has a twofold effect: it leads to apathy on the
part of those who are discriminated against, and it results in an "unjustified clash of interests"4 between black workers and white workers and thereby considerably reduces the effectiveness of the bargain-

I
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t This Article is based on a speech presented by the author to the Labor Law
Section of the American Bar Association at Dallas, Texas, on August 11, 1969.
• Professor of Law, ,vayne State University. A.B. 1958, University of Rhode
Island; LL.B. 1961, Cornell University; Graduate Study 1962-1963, London School of
Economics.-Ed.
I. Florida Road Workers, in MODERN AMERICAN POETRY 594 (L. Untermeyer ed.1950).
2. 70 L.R.R.M. 2489 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 7) I, cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3173 (U.S.
Nov. IO, 1969). On remand from the court of appeals, the NLRB ordered a rehearing.
Farmers' Cooperative Compress, 72 L.R.R.M. 1251 (Oct. 9, 1969).
3. 70 L.R.R.M. at 2497.
4. 70 L.R.R.M. at 2495.
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ing unit. Undoubtedly, some will object to the result reached in that
case on the ground that the NLRA was not intended to be a fair
employment practices statute. 5 But there is another significant flaw
in the opinion. That flaw is the attempt to equate the effects of
racial inequality in public education-effects that existed in the
situation in Brown v. Board of Education 6-with the effects of
racial discrimination in employment. Such an equation is not at all
in step with current events. Thus, Judge Skelly Wright's conclusion,
in Packinghouse Workers that "racial discrimination creates in its
victims an apathy or docility which inhibits them from asserting
their rights against the perpetrator of the discrimination" 7 is arguably anachronistic.
The problem with such an observation is that it comes at a time
·when the black worker is anything but docile. Indeed, employers and
unions in such metropolitan areas as Detroit and Chicago are well
aware of the new militancy of Negro employees who are frustrated
by what they regard as discriminatory or poor working conditions
and by the failure of the almost lily-white union leadership to
correct those conditions.
The explosiveness of the situation can be seen not only in the
frustrations of the black workers, but also in the increasingly organized hostility of those white workers who are just a rung above
the Negro on the economic ladder, and who constitute what is
probably the most alienated group in our society today. Moreover,
the measures which have been taken to assist the cause of racial
equality in employment, and which appear threatening to the white
workers, have been ineffective to eliminate the practices which
arouse the blacks. Indeed, Congress has thus far failed to provide
5. This argument first appeared with respect to the question whether a failure
of a union to fulfill its duty of fair representation of its members constitutes an unfair labor practice. But despite the strong objections of Chairman McCulloch and
Member Fanning, a majority of the National Labor Relations Board have never been
troubled either by the argument presented in the text or by the absence of legislative
history supporting the conclusion that a breach of the duty of fair representation
constitutes an unfair labor practice; and they have come to that conclusion. See
United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
837 (1967); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d
172 (2d Cir. 1963). But there are two differences between the duty found by Judge
Wright in Packinghouse Workers and the duty of fair representation. First, when
Congress passed the 1947 amendments to the NLRA, it was presumably aware that
the Supreme Court had devised a judicial doctrine of fair representation. Second, the
duty of fair representation is a logical corollary to the principle of the union as ex•
clusive bargaining representative. Hence, there is a stronger argument for sustaining
the administratively fashioned duty of fair representation than there is for upholding
Judge Wright's attempt to make racial discrimination an unfair labor practice for an
employer.
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. 70 L.R.R.M. at 2495.
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the appropriations and the enforcement authority which are necessary
if the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is to
enhance the likelihood that racial equality in jobs will become a
reality for blacks. As EEOC Chairman Brown recently said, "[t]he
only thing we can do if we find discrimination is to sit down with
the employer or with the union and negotiate or conciliate the
particular case.... It is almost impossible for us to do the job that
has to be done unless and until we get cease-and-desist powers."8
Thus, the net effect of the remedial steps that have been taken
has been to increase the frustrations of both groups. While increased
hostility on the part of white workers may be an inevitable sideeffect of curing racially discriminatory employment practices, the
situation would be considerably less explosive if the cure could eliminate the frustrations of at least the black workers.
When the rules of the collective bargaining game were being
created and developed under the NLRA, discrimination in employment was still being openly engaged in; in fact, Congress did not
address itself to the problem until 1964.9 But when Congress did
enact title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196410 (title VII), and
when it voted appropriations for the Executive Order which the Act
took cognizance of, 11 it operated under the assumption that in a
substantial number of instances black workers were not being dealt
with fairly in the collective bargaining process. Had it not thought
so, the detailed debate12 and the comprehensive legislation would
have been unnecessary. Accordingly, if the national labor law is to
reflect current congressional views of collective bargaining activities
insofar as race is concerned, then the NLRA, and the assumptions
and practices which have developed under it, must be accommodated
to the objectives of civil rights legislation. But until the principle
of equality for black and white workers is effectuated in the labor8. N.Y. Times, July 21, 1969, at 30, col. I. However, Chairman Brown's views on
the matter have apparently changed. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1969, at I, col. 5. See also
Jons AND CIVIL RIGHTS (Prepared for tlxe U.S. Civil Rights Commission by tlxe Brookings
Institution, 1969).
9. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)-(h) (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000(d)-l(e), -l(g) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
10. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964).
11. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963 comp.), as amended, Exec.
Order No. 11,162, 3 C.F.R. 215 (1964-1965 comp.). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 recognized tlxis order in § 709(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(d) (1964). Executive Order No. 10,925
has been superceded by Exec. Order No. II,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 comp.), as
amended, Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 320 (1967 comp.), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp.
IV, 1965-1968).
12. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 11,719 (1964) (remarks of Senator Tower); IIO CONG.
REc. 12,595 (1964) (remarks of Senator Clark). See generally H.R. REP. No. 914, 88tlx
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); S. REP. No. 872, 88tlx Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
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management context, it is the duty of the courts, operating under
both the NLRA and title VII, to root out the past practices and
to fashion remedies which mirror the more recently developed
policy against discrimination.
The Supreme Court has taken such action in many similar areas.
It has demonstrated an unflagging hostility to racial discrimination
in voting, education, selection of juries, and housing. With respect
to voting, the Court has held that eligibility requirements which
were not applied to whites when discrimination was previously
practiced must be set aside in order to root out the remnants of
past inequality. 13 The Court's inclination to re_ad civil rights statutes and constitutional guarantees of equality expansively is also
typified by its treatment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in Allen
v. State Board of Elections. 14 In that case, the legislature had enacted laws which altered the previously existing election procedures
in three ways: they changed the basis of county elections from
district-wide voting to at-large voting; they provided that some
county officials were to be appointed rather than elected; and they
created more difficulties for potential third party candidates than
had previously existed. Despite damaging indications in the legislative history of the Act, the Court held that these laws had to be
submitted for approval either to the Attorney General of the United
States or to the District Court for the District of Columbia, since
they constituted a "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting,
or standard, practice or procedure with respect to voting,'' 1 " as contemplated by the Voting Rights Act. The Court stated: "The
Voting Rights Act was aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious,
state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their
right to vote because of their race." 16
In education, the Court has announced that the test for compliance with the fourteenth amendment is whether the school
board's desegregation plan in fact accomplishes the stated objective-integration of the races. 17 Thus, in order to devise an effective
13. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
14. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
16. 393 U.S. at 565.
17. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Raney v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 443 (1968); Monroe v. Board of Commrs., 391 U.S. 450 (1968). The Court's
most recent decision on school desegregation is Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of
Educ., 90 S. Ct. 14 (1969), in which the Court found that Brown's requirement of
desegregation with "all deliberate speed" was no longer constitutionally permissible.
90 S. Ct. at 15-16. The Court then ordered the school districts involved in the case to
begin desegregation "immediately."
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remedy in this area, race must be consciously taken into account.18
Discrimination in the jury system has been measured to some extent, although perhaps not as much as it should be, by statistics.19
Finally, with respect to housing, the Court recently held in Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Company20 that the Civil Rights Act of 1866
prohibits racial discrimination in housing, and it indicated that
the Constitution is especially concerned with remedying the vestiges
of slavery for the American Negro. 21
But the Warren Court never had the opportunity to interpret the provisions of title VII or to accommodate the NLRA
to the legally recognized problems faced by racial minorities. 22 Indeed, the Court's last holding of major significance in this area was
Steele v. Louisville b Nashville Railway Company 23 which is a
quarter of a century old and thus antedates Chief Justice Warren's
appointment by almost ten years. Therefore, for better or worse,
it is the Burger Court which will have the chance to shape the law
of employment discrimination. That Court will be faced with few
18. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.), afjd.
with modifications on rehearing, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1966) (en bane), cert. denied
sub nom. Caddo Parish School Bd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). But see
Vieira, Racial Imbalance, Black Separatism, and Permissible Classification by Race, 67
MICH. L. REV. 1553, 1603-04 (1969).
19. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Aikins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945);
Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
20. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See Larson, The New Law of Race Relations, 1969 Wis.
L. REv. 470. Compare Dobbins v. Local 212, !BEW, 69 L.R.R.M. 2313 (S.D. Ohio
1968), with Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Intl. Harvester Co., 71 L.R.R.M. 2886
(N.D. Ill. July 14, 1969), and Harrison v. American Can Co., 2 FAIR EMPL. PRAc. CAS.
I (S.D. Ala. July 8, 1969), on the applicability of Jones to racial discrimination in employment. See also Gould, The Emerging Law Against Racial Discrimination in Employment, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 359, 376-78 (1969).
21. 392 U.S. at 437-44.
22. See generally M. SOVERN, LEGAL REsrRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT (1966); Aaron, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation Under the Railway Labor and National Labor Relations Acts, 34 J. AIR L. & CoM. 167 (1968);
Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 CoLUM. L.
REv. 563 (1962).
23. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). In that case, the Court held that the Railway Labor Act
imposed on a union acting as the exclusive bargaining agent for a class of employees the duty to represent all employees without discrimination because of their race.
This has become known as the doctrine of fair representation. See text accompanying
notes 33-34 infra. Of course, there have been a number of fair representation cases
decided by the Court subsequent to Steele in both a racial and a nonracial context,
and some of them were decided by the Warren Court. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957);
Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1956); Ford v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944). See generally St. Antoine, Judicial
Valour and the Warren Court's Labor Decisions, 67 MxcH. L. REv. 317 (1968), on the
role of the Warren Court and labor law.
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problems, if any, which will be more important than the question
of the precise limitations on discriminatory employment practices.
On those decisions will hinge the ability of Negro workers to compete economically with whites and to educate their children effectively. I£ the decisions interpret civil rights law expansively, the
cost pressures of the black protest will be imposed upon employers;
and the business community may perforce become more interested
in correcting the many other ailments of the ghetto.
In dealing with the problems of employment discrimination,
the Burger Court will have to face several new and major issues.
This Article is concerned with two of the most important of those
issues. The first is whether the present requirement that workers
seek redress of their grievances through the exclusive representation
of the union is applicable to victims of racial discrimination; and
if not, what other remedies should be available to those workers.
The second is whether quotas and ratios based on race are permissible; and if so, whether it is required that they be used to integrate
union leadership after a merger of two previously segregated unions.
While the main focus of this Article is on these problems, it will
also deal briefly with the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in
Gaston County v. United States24 on remedies for existing discriminatory employment practices resulting from past segregation.

II.

THE FAILURE OF THE UNION AS EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING
REPRESENTATIVE IN DISCRIMINATION CASES
AND POSSIBLE REMEDIES

Both the NLRA25 and the Railway Labor Act26 provide that
a union selected by a majority of the workers within a particular
craft or industrial unit is the exclusive bargaining agent for each
worker in that unit, whether or not he is a member of the elected
union. In interpreting those statutory provisions, the Supreme Court
has held that individual employment contracts can be contravened
by the union's exclusive authority, and that an employer is prohibited by statute from negotiating with individual employees
rather than with the exclusive a,gent. 27 The neat orderliness of
those principles, coupled with a faith in the benefits of the arbi24. 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
26. 45 U.S.C. § 152(fourth) (1964).
27. Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944); J.I. Case Co. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
28. United Steelworkers v. Warrior &: Gulf Nav. Corp., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
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tration process,28 convinced the Warren Court that proceeding
to arbitration is the union's prerogative unless the union has engaged in bad faith conduct,29 and that an individual worker cannot
obtain a judicial hearing of a complaint until he has exhausted any
negotiated grievance-arbitration machinery which is applicable to
his situation.30 Moreover, since resort to the judiciary £or the adjudication of contract claims would undermine arbitration, the employee in most instances cannot have his case reviewed on the
merits.31 These principles of law, however, were articulated in a
nonracial context, and they should, ideally, have no adverse impact
on the interests of workers of minority races.
In Steele v. Louisville &- Nashville Railway Company,32 the
Supreme Court imposed on unions a duty of fair representation.33
In that case, the Court held that a union acting as the exclusive bargaining representative of a craft or class of employees has the obligation to represent all employees in the craft without discrimination on
the basis of their race, and that the courts have jurisdiction to protect the minority of the craft or class from a violation of that
obligation.84 Nevertheless, history has shown that the procedures
requiring workers to seek redress solely through the exclusive representative have been inadequate to solve the problems of victims
of racial discrimination.85 Accordingly, in some situations involving
racial discrimination against a worker, the Court has abandoned
its ordinary rules and has allowed the worker to go directly to
court without first proceeding through the union. Thus, the courts
have agreed that when a worker alleges racial discrimination, but
not a contractual violation, exhaustion of the grievance-arbitration
machinery is not required. 36 When both are alleged, however, it
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &: Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
29. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
30. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
31. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185-86 (1968). It is not entirely clear, however,
whether the Court is addressing itself to union exhaustion or to employee exhaustion when it speaks of exhaustion of contractual remedies and indicates that a worker
may bring suit against an employer despite the absence of exhaustion in the event
that the union has breached its duty of fair representation. The requirement is
probably union exhaustion.
32. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
33. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
34. 323 U.S. at 199.
35. See text accompanying notes 40-42 infra.
36. See United States v. Georgia Power Co., 71 L.R.R.M. 2784 (N.D. Ga. May 16,
1969); Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 265 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ala. 1969), revd.
on other grounds, 406 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1969); King v. Georgia Power Co., 69 L.R.R.M.
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is much more doubtful that bypassing the union's procedures will
be permitted.37 Nonetheless, in Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco
Railway,38 a case presenting allegations of both racial discrimination
and contract violation, the Court unanimously held that exhaustion
is not required when the reactions of union officials plainly indicate
that the processing of grievances through machinery controlled by
the union and the employer would be a futile act. In that case, which
concerned a dispute over seniority and promotions, the Court relied heavily upon the demonstrated failure of the union to respond
when the plaintiffs had "called upon" it to seek redress. As of this
date, the question whether a mere allegation of racial discrimination
and contract violation, without the union hostility demonstrated in
Glover, permits a plaintiff to bypass privately negotiated arbitration
procedures has not been answered. 39
The significance of Glover and the need for an extension of the
doctrine expressed in that case can best be seen by reference to
the enactment of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title
VII implicitly recognized both the ineffectiveness of the Steele doctrine of fair representation40 and the unwillingness of labor and
management to take affirmative action against discrimination. By
enacting that statute, Congress determined that, despite the plaudits
which American unions and employers had given one another for
good race relations, and despite the supposed "bulwark" provided
by Steele and the duty of fair representation,4 1 legislation was necessary. Yet although some commentators have praised both the craft
and the industrial unions for their progress after the enactment
2094 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Reese v. Atlantic Steel Co., 282 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ga. 1967);
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967), revd., 2 FAIR EMPL,
PRAC. CAS. 121 (7th Cir. Sept. 26, 1969).
37. See ·waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Intl. Harvester Co., 71 L.R.R.M. 2886
(N.D. Ill. July 14, 1969); cf. NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding
Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968); Brady v. Trans-World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87 (3d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969).
38. 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
39. See note 37 supra. In Waters v. Wisconsin Steel ·works of Intl. Harvester Co.,
71 L.R.R.M. 2886 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 1969), Glover was distinguished because there was
no showing of futility.
40. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
In essence, this is the analysis initially set forth in Gould, Non-Governmental
Remedies in Employment Discrimination, in ABA IN5rITUTE PROC. ON EQUAL EMPLOY•
MENT OPPORTUNITY LAW (1969) [reprinted in 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 865 (1969)]. That
basic theme applies to various aspects of the existing industrial relations system. See
Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L.
REv. 40 (1969); Gould, Black Power in the Unions: The Impact upon Collective Bar•
gaining Relationships, 79 YALE L.J. 46 (1969).
41. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1968), in which the Warren Court made this
exaggerated claim.
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of title VII, 42 that progress has, on the whole, been quite insignificant. Developments during the five years since the passage of the
Act do not support any greater confidence in the handling of racial
issues at the bargaining table than that expressed by Congress in
1964. The rise of the black militant, whose logic is sometimes unsteady and irrational, is evidence of the distance between the white
leaders of organized labor and the young Negro rank-and-file which
is not afraid to challenge authority. Thus, it appears that the present
procedures for handling the grievances of black workers-procedures
requiring that those workers proceed through their union-are inadequate.
In some cases, the use of the Glover decision will be able to
cure that inadequacy. Such cases are those in which the conflict
between the collective agreement and the law clearly demonstrates
that arbitration through the union. would be inappropriate and
useless. 43 But in situations in which the futility of using established
arbitration procedures is not clear, other solutions must be sought.
One possible solution involves an extension of the Glover decision
to exempt all cases involving racial discrimination from the exhaustion doctrine.
But if Glover is not so extended, then some other type of protection
for the Negro worker, who is less than confident about how the
parties to the bargaining agreement will dispose of his claim, is
necessary if the exhaustion doctrine is to be upheld as fair. In
formulating that protection, it is imperative that the minority group
worker himself become involved in the adjudication of his grievances, and that he have, if he wishes, the assistance of a representative who has his trust and confidence, such as a civil rights
organization or a black worker's committee. Even if Glover is extended, so that the exhaustion requirement becomes totally inapplicable to racial discrimination cases, some kind of third party
involvement should still be available to black workers. That conclusion is supported by three considerations. First, the other principal avenues for relief-those established by title VII-are heavily
congested because of a lack of appropriations and because of the
42. See, e.g., F. RAY MARSHALL &: v. BIGGS, EQUAL .APPRENTICESHIP OPPORTUNITIES:
THE NATURE OF THE ISSUE AND THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE (1968). Compare id., with
Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 22
RUTGERS L. REV. 465 (1968); Gould, The Negro Revolution and Trade Unionism, 114
CONG. REc. 24872 (1968); O'Hanlon, The Case Against the Unions, FORTUNE, Jan. 1968,
at 170. See generally U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPDRTUNITY REPORT No. 1 (1967).
43. Cf. United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 837 (1967): Goodyear Tire &: Rubber Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 240 (1965).
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statutory defects alluded to by Chairman Brown.44 Second, while
the grievant may allege racial discrimination, the heart of the issue
may be white insensitivity about the conditions of employment
which are not cognizable either as a violation of a no-discrimination
clause or as a statutory violation. Third, the availability of third
party intervention would eliminate any need for resort to the courts,
and it would thus make possible the use of arbitrators who, as the
Court so clearly indicated in the Steelworkers trilogy,45 have a good
deal of expertise to bring to bear on plant grievances of all kinds.
Thus far, the courts have not looked with favor on the principle
of third party intervention and have viewed it as an unnecessary
intrusion on a stable collective relationship. The leading case in
this area is Acuff v. United Paperworkers4 6 which did not involve
consideration of race. In that case, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that wildcat strikers had no right
to separate representation in an arbitration proceeding because
there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of the union. The
court reasoned that since the union has almost plenary authority
to decide whether a grievance is to be pursued to the highest step
of the conflict-resolution ladder,47 it should also be able to control
every phase of the grievance procedure, including the question of
participation in the hearing.
There is, however, some question as to the continuing validity
of the Acuff decision, for it is at least arguable that the tendency
of the Warren Court toward adulation for union-negotiated grievance machinery will not be the pattern of the Burger Court. Furthermore, Vaca v. Sipes48-which initially set the stringent standards
for establishing a violation of the fair representation duty, 49 and thus
laid the foundation for Acuff-is hardly a balanced opinion. More
important, the logic of Vaca does not require the result reached in
Acuff. Indeed, Vaca's reasoning that the union has broad discretion
to decide whether to go to arbitration does not compel, as the
court in Acuff apparently thought it did, the conclusion that the
union has absolute control over the grievance procedure. If the
court's reasoning in Acuff were sound, it would follow that when44. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
45. See note 28 supra.
46. 404 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969). Justice Black was
of the opinion that certiorari should have been granted. See Fleming, Some Problems
of Due Process and the Fair Procedure in Labor Arbitration, 13 STAN. L. R.Ev. 235
(1961); Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration, in PROC. OF THE 11TH .ANNUAL l\lEETING,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, THE ARBITRATOR AND THE PARTIES 1 {1958).
47. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
48. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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ever an employee has a grievance, the union could fashion that
grievance into whatever form it desired-even one to which the
employee was unalterably opposed. Finally, in Humphrey v. Moore/10
Justice White seriously discussed the possible need for third party
representation and thereby gave credence to the notion that its
availability is a necessary element in the duty of fair representation.111
However, the Court can devise effective arbitral remedies for
racial discrimination in employment without rejecting either Vaca
or Acuff. That fact is clear from the approach taken by Justice
Douglas in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills: 52
The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some
substantive law. It points out what the parties may or may not do
in certain situations. Other problems will lie in the penumbra of
expressed statutory mandate. Some will lack expressed statutory
sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of legislation
and the fashioning of remedies that will effectuate that policy. The
range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature
of the problem.113

Certainly the labor and management practices which gave rise to
title VII's prohibitions against racial discrimination make proposals for representation of ,workers by third parties compatible
with the Court's instructions in Lincoln Mills~ since civil rights
legislation dealing with employment practices must be regarded
as part of the substantive law to which the Court referred. In addition, the nation has a special obligation to Negro workers-an
obligation which results from the existence of slavery and from
the systematic discrimination that followed it. 54 Thus, some form
of third party involvement is a minimum protection for the black
worker who desires it and whose grievance alleges both racial discrimination and contract violation. Such a procedure is hardly at
variance with the principle of exclusivity or with the objective of
uniformity, since it incorporates the dissidents within the unionemployer structure rather than forcing them out of that structure.
49. Those standards are discussed in text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
50. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
51. 375 U.S. at 349.
52. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
53. 353 U.S. at 457 (emphasis added).
54. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1969); Comment, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1295 (1969). With
respect to industrial relations, see Gould, Labor Arbitration Grievances Involving
Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 40 (1969); Gould, Black Power in the Union:
The Impact upon Collective Bargaining Relationships, 79 YALE L.J. 46 (1969).
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It is therefore much more consistent with the uniformity principle
than is the procedure allowed in Glover, which permits the circumvention of the private machinery.
Third party intervention would be particularly important when
"disadvantaged" workers are hired, because the employment of
such persons is likely to lead to disputes over the discharges and
disciplinary measures that result from absenteeism and poor work
habits. Such disputes will probably be common in these circumstances, because a tradition of inferior housing, poor environment,
and inadequate education frequently makes adjustment difficult for
the newly hired black worker, particularly if he has never held a
long-term job. Moreover, the lack of free or inexpensive transportation for the worker to his job-site increases the likelihood that he will
miss numerous days of work. 55 Although a dual standard of discipline for blacks and whites is a possible solution to the problems
which arise in this area, it is not a satisfactory one. The resentment
of the white worker who is given a two-day suspension for excessive
tardiness, while his black counterpart goes unpunished, would know
no bounds. 56 Although that factor normally should not be taken
into account in civil rights controversies57-even those in the employment area58-any management operating under such a system
is likely to have severe morale problems. Furthermore, it would not
be economically desirable to require employers to ignore absenteeism and poor work habits. Indeed, it would be extremely difficult
for a company which is in competition with other businesses for
a profit to tolerate practices which impair productivity. 59 Thus,
a dual standard of discipline would probably be an ineffective
method for dealing with the adjustment problems of a new disadvantaged worker.
A preventive approach is another solution. Under it, labor and
management would provide temporary help during the period of
adjustment for the employee who has not previously been exposed
to the discipline of the work place. But for that solution to be effec55. The problem of overly expensive transportation to· work has been a point
of dispute for some time in the Detroit area.
56. See St. Antoine, Litigation and Meditation Under Title T'II of tlze Civil Rights
Act of 1964, in ABA !NsrITUTE PROC. ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY LAW (1969).
57. Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 300 (1955).
58. Cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
59. Unfortunately, the situation under discussion here cannot be equated with the
refusal of Orthodox Jews and Seventh Day Adventists to work at certain times, be•
cause in those cases the minority is small and thus the harm to the employer
is slight. To the contrary, in the area of programs to hire the disadvantaged, the
hope is that the minority will become a sizeable one.

December 1969]

Racial Equality in Jobs and Unions

249

tive, unions and employers must be willing to teach new employees
how to tell time, how to read bus stop signs, and so on; and they
must also be willing, perhaps, to provide free or inexpensive transportation to work. These efforts require both a substantial expenditure of time and money and a great deal of willingness on
the part of labor and management, and neither is to be anticipated.
Indeed, the infrequency with which such assistance has been provided was pointed out by Saul Wallen:
[S]ome unions have been willing to negotiate special probationary
arrangements to apply to their company's hard-core employment
problems. But this has been far from universal. No data are available and one can only speculate on the extent to which rigid agreement provisions, drawn for typical labor market conditions, have
thwarted the recruitment and training of the special population
that makes up the hard-core unemployed. 60

Since no solution appears to be easy, then, the difficult practical problems involved in hiring disadvantaged workers are likely
to lead to discharges and disciplinary measures. Those measures,
in turn, lead to complex disputes which cannot, or will not, be
solved either by employers or by unions. Thus, third party representation-the "triangular relationship," as one court referred to
it61-is necessary for the resolution of such disputes.
III.

THE PERMISSIBILITY OF QUOTAS BASED ON

RACE

AND

THEIR USE IN INTEGRATING UNION LEADERSHIP

Nearly twenty years have passed since the Supreme Court
unanimously decided in Hughes v. Superior Court, 62 that the California courts could enjoin civil rights picketing which was aimed
at the alleged practice of job discrimination and which was designed
to result in the hiring of Negroes in proportion to the Negro patronage of the picketed
establishment. Justice Frankfurter, who
j
wrote the opinion; was careful to qualify the Court's holding by
emphasizing that the injunction was permissible only in light of
California's good judicial record in dealing with racial discrimination in employment. 63 The Hughes opinion contains many defects, but its primary effect was to inhibit race consciousness in
60. Wallen, Industrial Relations Problems of Employing the Disadvantaged,
Pnoc. OF THE 22n ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS (1969).
61. United States v. Hayes Intl. Corp., 70 L.R.R.M. 2926 (N.D. Ala. 1968), revd. on
other grounds, 2 FAIR EMPL. PRAc. CAS. 67 (5th Cir. Aug. 19, 1969).
62. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
63. 339 U.S. at 463-64.

250

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68:237

devising remedies for employment discrimination and to encourage
the labeling of all such attempts as forbidden "quotas." That
situation is changing now. Outside the labor area, the most notable
recent instance of a policy reversal is United States v. Montgomery
County Board of Education. 64 In that case, a unanimous Court,
speaking through Justice Black, held that the use of a "ratio" of
white to Negro faculty members was an appropriate means of
dealing with past discrimination in the public school system. The
Court specifically noted that it was not holding that racially balanced faculties were constitutionally required in all instances; but
it also rejected the holding of the court of appeals that the ratio
should be "substantially or approximately" complied with and that
compliance with the desegregation orders should not be tested solely
in terms of ratio. 65 Although the Supreme Court admitted that the
ratio would be "troublesome" if it were regarded as an inflexible
approach which might cause an injustice to the school board, it
stated that such was not the case in the circumstances before it. 66
The Court based that conclusion on the district court's careful
analysis of prior discriminatory practices67 and on the facility with
which the school board could achieve the required ratio.
There is a similar trend in the labor area. That trend can be
seen in the Department of Labor's recent announcement of the
Revised Philadelphia Plan. 68 There the Department took the position that an "effective affirmative action program" under the
President's Executive Order69 requires that certain racially oriented
factors be considered in determining a definite standard for minority employment in the better-paid trades in Philadelphia. Those
standards are (1) the current extent of minority group participation in the trade; (2) the availability of minority group persons
for employment in the trade; (3) the need for training programs
64. 395 U.S. 225 (1969).
65. United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 400 F.2d I (5th Cir.), afjg.
289 F. Supp. 647 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
66. 395 U.S. at 234-35.
67. 289 F. Supp. at 649-52.
68. Department of Labor, Order Requiring Specific Goals for Hiring Minorities
in Better-Paying Philadelphia Construction Jobs, June 27, 1969; Memorandum from
Assistant Secretary of Labor Fletcher to Heads of All Agencies, June 27, 1969.
69. See Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 comp.), as amended, Exec.
Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 320 (1967 comp.), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. IV, 19651968). For a discussion of Executive Order No. 11,246, see Jons AND CIVIL RIGHTS, supra
note 8; Powers, Federal Procurement and Equal Employment opportunity, 29 LAw &:
CONTEMP. PROB. 468 (1964).
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in the area or the need to assure a demand for those who are in
an existing program or who have recently left one; and (4) the
impact of the proposed program upon the existing labor force.
The Department of Labor has argued persuasively that its plan
is not prohibited by the antipreferential-treatment provision of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.70 But without regard to the legal
issues, the very existence of such a plan provides an indication,
as do some recent court rulings,71 that the mere thought of a quota
no longer prevents the implementation of truly effective remedies
for past discrimination.
It is unclear, however, whether the principles of race consciousness enunciated in Montgomery County and the Revised Philadelphia Plan are pertinent to the critical problem of integrating union
leadership so that the races may share power equitably. Many of
the difficulties that were discussed in connection with third party
intervention and the black workers' distrust of union leadership72
result from a confrontation between a black rank-and-file and a
predominantly white union officialdom. The problem of integrating
union leadership is particularly important when two local unions
that have been segregated in the past-one all white and the other
all black-merge as required by title VII. 73 Great tension will
arise after such a merger if Negro local officers are voted out by a
white majority, especially when past discrimination in employment
conditions has been engaged in by the white local.74 Can title VII
be said to require the use of a quota or a ratio in order to insure
that in these circumstances the minority group will have some
representation?
Since it was the white leadership which initially negotiated the
discriminatory conditions, and which probably imposed the segregation of the locals, that leadership's unchecked control of the union's
position after a merger hardly bodes well for a collective bargain70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1964). The Attorney General has approved the Plan. See
Opinion of Attorney General John N. Mitchell on Legality of Revised Philadelphia
Plan, DAILY l.AnOR REPORT No. 184, at E-1 (Sept. 23, 1969).
71. Local 53, Intl. Assn. of Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogel, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th
Cir. 1969); Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Weiner v. Cuyahoga
Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1969).
72. See text accompanying notes 36-45 supra.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1964).
74. Moreover, severe eligibility requirements can often effectively discourage
newly hired black workers from participating in internal union political activities
and from electing other blacks to leadership positions. Cf. Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel
& Club Employees, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492 (1968); Wirtz v. National Maritime Union,
284 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 399 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1968).
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ing process which is supposed to be fair to the Negro minority.
If black elected officers are not able to participate in policy judgments, then the union's policy-making body is akin to a malapportioned or gerrymandered legislature. Even more analogous to the
situation at hand is that which arose in Allen v. State Board of
Elections. 75 In that case, the Supreme Court held that a state which
is within the coverage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 cannot
convert its district system of election to an at-large system without
a declaratory judgment or approval by the Attorney General, because the proposed conversion might result in a dilution of the
Negro vote. The Court found that, "[v]oters who are members of a
racial minority might well be in the majority in one district, but
in a decided minority in the county as a whole. This type of change
could therefore nullify their ability to elect the candidate of their
choice just as would prohibiting some of them from voting." 76 Similarly, in the labor situation, when two segregated unions merge and
black workers become the minority, the merger could cause those
workers to lose all representation in the union leadership as effectively as would a total prohibition on their right to vote.77
Some of these issues arose in Chicago Federation of Musicians,
Local 10 v. American Federation of Musicians. 78 In that case, the
international union proposed to merge a local which was all Negro
with one which was all white. Its merger plan provided that members of the black local would have the right to select a certain number of local union officials during a transitional period consisting
of the first six years of the merged local's existence. The white local
then challenged the international's proposal on two grounds: that
a trusteeship had been formed in violation of the Landrum-Griffin
Act, 79 and that such a trusteeship, together with the merger pro75. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
76. 393 U.S. at 569.
77. See also note 74 supra.
78. 57 L.R.R.M. 2227 (N.D. ill. 1964). Cf. Gould, The Negro Revolution and the
Law of Collective Bargaining, 34 FORDHAM L. REv. 207, 255-57 (1965). In United States
v. Local 189, United Papermakers, 57 CCH Lab. Cas. 1J 9120 (E.D. La. 1968), a consent
decree was issued providing that, during a transitional period, formerly segregated
locals would have separate representation. See also Daye v. Tobacco ·workers, 234 F.
Supp. 815 (D.D.C. 1964).
79. 57 L.R.R.M. at 2230. Section 3(h) of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. 403(h)
(1964) defines trusteeship as, "any receivership, trusteeship, or other method of supervision or control whereby a labor organization suspends the autonomy otherwise
available to a subordinate body under its constitution or bylaws." When a trusteeship
is formed, various requirements are imposed upon the labor organization which forms
it. See Landrum-Griffin Act tit. III, 29 U.S.C. §§ 419-24 (1964).

December 1969)

Racial Equality in Jobs and Unions

253

posal, violated title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.80 A federal
district court rejected those contentions and held that the merger
arrangement was not improper from a "practical standpoint," since
the international union was attempting to induce the merger
through a guarantee of representation to members of the black
locals.81 Although the court noted that title VII was not effective
at the time that the suit was filed, it did indicate that, because the
plan was designed to promote integration and to protect the smaller
local, the statute was not violated.82
The Chicago Federation case indicates only that a plan which allocates seats to each local is permissible under title VII; it does not
deal with the question whether the statute can be read to impose
black representation upon the merged local in certain circumstances.
But the clear intent of title VII would be undermined if the use
of subtle devices-such as the voting out of black leaders-to lessen
the value of the black vote were permitted. As the Allen case demonstrated in connection with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the use of
such evasionary measures cannot be allowed. 83 Thus, it appears that
title VII should be read to require some fixed or proportionate
number of blacks in union leadership positions when the alternative is complete exclusion. The EEOC apparently accepted that
type of reasoning, for, by holding in a recent case that title VII
prohibits the dismissal of a black local's officials by white leadership
after a merger,84 it indicated that it will review merger terms. 85
The problem of using ratios to integrate union leadership will
80. 57 L.R.R.M. at 2230. Section 703(c) of title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c), provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization(!) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or fail or
refuse to refer for .:mployment any individual, in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit
such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section.
81. 57 L.R.R.M. at 2227.
82. 57 L.R.R.M. at 2236.
83. See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
84. Case No. NO 7-3-336U, 71 LAB. REL. REP. 339 (EEOC June 18, 1969).
85. The Commission relied, in part, on the lack of any attempt "to merge the
staffs of the two unions on a nondiscriminatory basis so as to approximate the
proportions of membership contributed by the two previously segregated locals."
71 I.An. REL. REP. at 340.
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presumably become more intense as the statute's effect becomes
stronger in dealing with segregation. It is extremely unrealistic to
believe that the election of white trade unionists who have practiced
segregation in the past is compatible with the even-handed treatment
which title VII supposedly contemplates for the plant community.
Assuming, then, that the statute does require that there be some
Negro representation, the extent of that required representation and
the size of the quota or ratio necessary for implementing it depend
upon the size of the merged local and, perhaps, upon the severity of
the discrimination previously practiced. It is clear that when the
EEOC and the courts make judgments of this nature, they must articulate them on an ad hoc basis, in order to provide the kind of
flexibility contained in both Montgomery County and the Philadelphia Plan.
Required representation in leadership is hardly inconsistent with
the Landrum-Griffin Act, since such a requirement simply adheres
to the democratic choice of the employees in each local union. Furthermore, required integrated leadership is a necessary step, because
the alternative to it, black separatism, is not a feasible, let alone desirable, objective in this country. If a merger of uvo segregated locals is allowed to dilute existing black power in the unions, there
will surely be industrial strife of a racial nature which is antithetical
to the policies of the NLRA; 86 and the circumstances of that dispute
will be bound to favor the rhetoric of the separatists. Thus, the
color line in unions, as well as in jobs, must be erased, and integrated
leadership must be ensured by an active and compulsory use of
quotas and ratios.

IV.

GASTON COUNTY AND THE GRANTING OF

COMPENSATORY SENIORITY AND TRAINING

While it is clear that black leadership in elected policy-making
positions at both the international87 and local level is a sine qua
86. 29 U.S.C. §§ 202(a), (b), 203 (1964).
87. On an international level, the problem is that district lines are drawn on a
regional basis, and Negroes are in a minority in each region, even in unions having
a large Negro membership, such as the United Automobile Workers and the United
Steelworkers. See Steelworkers Debate Black Representation, 91 MONTHLY LAB. REv.
16-17 (1968). The UAW circumvented this problem in 1962 by electing to the Board
a Negro Member-at-Large, Nelson Jack Edwards. More recently, the first Negro Regional Director-Board Member, Marcellius Ivory, was elected. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 1,
1968, at 11, col. 8; Owens, Negro Is Pilot for 74,000-1\fember UAW Region, Detroit
Free Press, Aug. 15, 1968, at 2E. See generally Henle, Some Reflections on Militants,
92 MONTHLY I.An. REv. 20 (1969); Hill, Black Protest and the Struggle for Union
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non for equality, the matter cannot be considered in a vacuum. Discriminatory employment conditions, which have their origins prior
to the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, still exist and
must be completely eliminated. During the past three years this
subject has been examined in detail, particularly with respect to the
problems of seniority and advancement,88 and there is no need to
reiterate those views here. However, a recent development may shed
some light on one of the most perplexing of those problems-that
faced by black workers who have been in an all-black department
of a plant and who are transferred to a department which had
previously been all white. In the usual case, those workers will have
no seniority in their new positions, and they will have little opportunity for advancement since title VII expressly compels advancement only for those workers who are qualified89 and the newly
transferred black workers will usually have neither the experience
nor the seniority to qualify them. Because this situation is the result
of prior discrimination, it is reasonable to argue that title VII requires unions and management to rectify their previous practices
by granting the transferred workers compensatory seniority credit
in their new positions and by providing to those with adequate potential the additional training necessary to qualify them for promotion.90 A recent decision of the Supreme Court, Gaston County v.
Democracy, I IssuES IN INDUS. SoCY. 19 (1969); Gannon, Black Unionists: Militant Negroes Press for a Stronger 1'oice in the Labor Movement, Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1968,
at I, col. I; Berstein, Fervor of Racial Protest Starting To Press Unions, Denver Post,
June 15, 1969, § J, at I; Stetson, Negro Members Are Challenging Union Leaders,
N.Y. Times, June 29, 1969, at 37, col. 2.
88. See Gould, Employment Security, Seniority and Race: The Role of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 How. L.J. 1 (1967); Gould, Seniority and the
Black Worker: Reflections on Quarles and Its Implications, 47 TEXAS L. REv. 1039
(1969); Cooper &: Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A
General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REv.
1598 (1969); St. Antoine, Litigation and Mediation Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, in ABA INSTITUTE PROC. ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
LAW (1969); Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1532 (1962); Note, Title VII Seniority Discrimination
and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1260 (1967). See also Local 189, United
Papermakers v. United States, 71 L.R.R.M. 3070 (5th Cir. July 28, 1969).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e•2(h) (1964). For discussions of the comparable "affirmative
action" remedial provision contained in § I0(c) of the NLRA, see St. Antoine, A
Touchstone for Labor Board Remedies, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 1039 (1968); Note, The
Need for Creative Orders Under Section JO(c) of the National Labor Relations Act,
ll2 U. PA, L. REv. 69 (1963). Section I0(c) authorizes the NLRB "to take such
affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay,
as will effectuate the policies of this [Act] ••.." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
90. I have made this argument before. See Gould, 13 How. L.J. I (1967), supra
note 88; Gould, 47 Texas L. Rev. 1039 (1969), supra note 88.
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United States, 91 in which analogous issues were raised, provides considerable support for that view.
The question in Gaston County was whether a state could escape
coverage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 because the low number
of registered voters was attributable to their lack of literacy. The
Court held that when the illiterate condition of Negro residents is
attributable to past inferior educational opportunities, the statute
is applicable and the state's literacy test must be suspended. The
Court emphasized the relationship between the existing conditions
and the past inequality:
It is only reasonable to infer that among black children compelled
to endure a segregated and inferior education, fewer will achieve
any given degree of literacy than will be so among their better-educated white contemporaries. And, on the Government's showing, it
was certainly proper to infer that Gaston County's inferior Negro
schools provided many of its Negro residents with subliterate education, and gave many others little inducement to enter or remain
in school.92
The lesson of Gaston County is that the state cannot take the
illiterate Negro as it finds him if the state educational facilities are
responsible for his condition. Much of the current fighting over
seniority systems and other employment conditions involves very
similar issues and contentions. Like the state in Gaston County,
unions and management argue that the denial of compensatory
seniority and training results from the previous practice of discrimination, and that the denial is not discriminatory in itself; no more
should be required of them than that they put an end to discriminatory employment practices. That viewpoint deserves no greater
acceptance by the Burger Court than that which the Warren Court
gave to the comparable defense in Gaston County.
In a recent case, however, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit £ailed to take cognizance of the full implications of Gaston
County. In that case, Local 189, United Papermakers v. United
States, 93 the court, while accepting the general principle that title
VII does not permit unions and employers to carry fonvard the effects of past discrimination in the employment relationship, stated
in dicta that the statute assists only those Negro workers who have
"qualifications," that is, existing skills, which qualify them for promotion without training. 94 The court found that "business neces91. 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
92. 395 U.S. at 295-96.
93. 71 L.R.R.M. 3070 (5th Cir. July 28, 1969).
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sity" would preclude the employment of black workers in jobs for
which the schools had failed to prepare them. 95 But the court did not
take account of the situation in which unions and employers become
involved in the discriminatory pattern by placing Negro workers in
nonpromotable, unskilled jobs. Gaston County indicates that, in
those circumstances, unions and management, because they were
originally responsible for the black workers' failure to build up
seniority in the new department and to receive adequate training
for advancement, must provide those workers with compensatory
seniority and training.
V.

CONCLUSION

As of this date, one cannot know whether the Burger Court will
permit the Negro worker to be left "standin' there" like Langston
Hughes' Florida road workers. The Court should not be deceived
by those who say that the problem of racial discrimination can be
dealt with effectively through full employment policies, although
surely effectuation of those policies is the foremost hope of both
races. But the immediate legal issues involve equity for the black
worker in terms of the jobs that are available now. Without that
kind of analysis, we must find ourselves saying with Mrs. Alving in
Ibsen's Ghosts: "Oh, that perpetual law and order! I often think that
that is what does all the mischief in this world of ours." 96
The issue, then, is whether the law of racial equality will be made
applicable to employment in a meaningful sense, that is, whether
the Court will alter the black worker's current plight which Langston
Hughes put so well when he said:
Sure,
A road helps all of us!
White folks rideAnd I get to see 'em ride.
94. 71 L.R.R.M. at 3071. Judge Wisdom's opinion did cite Gaston County for the
proposition that, in order for title VII to be operative, past discrimination need not
be unlawful at the time at which it was engaged in.
95. The court stated:
Not all "but-for" consequences of :pre-Act racial classification warrant relief under Title VII. For example, unquestionably Negroes, as a class, educated at allNegro schools in certain communities have been denied skills available to their
white contemporaries. That fact would not, however, prevent employers from
requiring that applicants for secretarial positions know how to type, even though
this requirement might prevent Negroes from being secretaries.
. • • Secretaries must be able to type. There is no way around that necessity ••.•
71 L.R.R.M. at 3076.
96. H. IBSEN, Ghosts, in 7 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF HENRIK IBSEN 220 (1924).
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I ain't never seen nobody
Ride so fine before.
Hey buddy!
Look at me.
I'm makin' a road! 9 7

97. Florida Road Workers, in
1950).
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